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REFLECTIONS ON ESTATE OF ROTHKO: THE ROLE
OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR IN RELATION
TO THE ARTIST
GUSTAVE HARROW*
LONG PRIOR TO HIS TRAcIC end in 1970, Mark Rothko wrote:
A picture lives by companionship, expanding and quickening in
the eyes of the sensitive observer. It dies by the same token. It is,
therefore, a risky and unfeeling act to send it out into the world.
How often it must be permanently impaired by the eyes of the
vulgar and cruelty of the impotent who would extend their affliction
universally!1
Perhaps more than any acclaimed modern artist, Rothko was in-
tensely concerned and preoccupied with the ultimate fate of his works.
Despite artistic and monetary success, broad recognition, and affiliation with
the world's then most flourishing modern art gallery, Rothko's ardent desires
for his art were not honored following his death. Even during life his feelings
of loss of control over his treasured oeuvre may well have contributed to his
suicide.
Rothko tried to keep his collection out of the "market-place," to maintain
certain-important works in groups, and to have his art located ultimately in the
environments in which it would be understood. But after his death docu-
ments emerged which disclosed an absence of minimal legal safeguards
which would ensure implementation of his artistic aspirations. Some of these
basic legal documents, produced in the course of the extraordinarily compli-
cated and protracted proceedings in Estate of Rothko,2 raise serious questions
concerning relationships between legal advisors and artists. Rothko's intense
concern about sending works "out into the world" reflects many artists'
reluctance to enter into the business and legal "worlds" of their art. Yet
without a basic understanding of legal and financial matters as they affect him,
- B.S.S., 1951, City College of New York; M.A., 1953, New School for Social Research; J.D.,
1957, Yale University; Member, New York Bar; Assistant Attorney General for the State of New
York. Mr. Harrow conducted the litigation in Estate of Rothko, on behalf of the Attorney
General for the State of New York. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author.
The author has recently published a further analysis of the decision of the New York Court of
Appeals in Estate of Rothko, discussing the court's treatment of the legal principles. Harrow,
The Final Word in the Rothko Case: Salient Legal Holdings of the Court of Appeals, 4 Art and the
Law (1978).
1 M. ROTHKO, TIGER'S EYE, no. 2 (1947).
2 The disposition of the Rothko litigation began with the decision of a New York Surrogate's
Court on December 18, 1975. Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830,379 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sur. Ct. 1975).
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division affirmed in March, 1977. Will of Rothko, 56 App. Div.
2d 499,392 N.Y.S.2d 870. The New York Court of Appeals, the State's highest court, affirmed on
November 22, 1977. In re Estate of Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977).
The trial, which began on February 14, 1974, encompassed 89 days and resulted in approxi-
mately 15,000 pages of trial transcript, 5,000 pages of pre-trial dispositions, and some 800
documents. 1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1977
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the artist may encounter not only unnecessary economic problems but the
defeat of central aesthetic goals. Estate of Rothko reveals the type of
responsibility a legal advisor to an artist ought to assume if he is to render a
service designed to advance not only his client's monetary interests, but the
integrity of his art and his artistic aspirations as well.
The Issues in Estate of Rothko
At the time of his death Rothko was one of the foremost exponents of
American Abstract Expressionism, a leading school of art "then recognized as
such throughout the art world."3 A statement attributed to Professor Meyer
Schapiro, an expert witness at the trial who was regarded "as one of the
foremost art historians in the field of modern art,"4 concluded that "at the time
of his death, Rothko was regarded by many artists and critics as an old master,
a painter who had established himself firmly as one of the three or four
outstanding American artists, and perhaps one of the half dozen greatest
living artists anywhere in the world."5
The issues in Rothko involved allegations that a plan set in motion by
friends of Rothko and his art dealer was designed to effectively acquire the
vast valuable collection of art owned by the artist at his death. The
petitioners in this proceeding, Rothko's daughter and the Attorney General of
the State of New York, argued that this plan was conceived by Francis K.
Lloyd, Rothko's international art dealer who controlled all operations of the
commercially successful Marlborough companies, and Bernard J. Reis, who
had been Rothko's accountant and advisor in legal matters and who became
one of his three executors. 6 Reis, who had advised many artist: and owned
hundreds of works of art, was director, secretary, and treasurer of Marlbo-
rough's New York gallery.7
When Rothko died he owned more than 800 of his own works," which
consisted of the bulk of the paintings he had created during his lifetime.
Within three months of his death his executors and Lloyd entered into
contracts for the disposition of all of the works in the residue of his estate -
798 paintings.9 In addition to Reis, the friends Rothko appointed as executors
were Theodoros Stamos, an artist who shortly after the 1970 transactions
entered into his own contract with Marlborough, and Morton Levine, a
professor of anthropology.
The daughter of the decedent, Kate Rothko, then not yet twenty-one years
of age, caused a proceeding to be commenced in Surrogate's Court, New
York County in November, 1971.10 Her petition sought a rescission of the
3 Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 834, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 932 (1975).
4 Id. at 861, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
5 Id. at 862, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
6 Id. at 836-37, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 932-33. See Attorney General's Answering Brief as Respond-
ent in the New York Court of Appeals, at 4-5, In re Estate of Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305,401 N.Y.S.2d
449(1975).
7 84 Misc. 2d at 832,379 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
Id. at 834,379 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
9 Id. at 836, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
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contracts disposing of Rothko's art, and removal of the executors on grounds
of unfair terms in the contracts, conflicts of interests, disloyalty, and wasting
of assets of the estate." Shortly after the petition on behalf of Kate Rothko
was filed, the Attorney General of New York appeared in the proceeding on
behalf of the public interest in charitable dispositions - "the ultimate
charitable beneficiaries" of the principal beneficiary, the Mark Rothko
Foundation. Thereafter, on June 5, 1972, the Attorney General filed his own
separately stated cross-petition.12 He charged that the agreements constitut-
ed "self-dealing and violations of fiduciary trust," a "fraud upon the estate" in
that they realized "only a fraction of their value," and "a total disregard of the
beneficiaries of the Foundation." The petitioners charged specifically that
Lloyd and Reis contemplated the immediate outright sale of 100 works for a
fraction of their value, and that they then planned to acquire the balance of the
select works by placing the entire collection in Lloyd's and Reis' control
through a "consignment" to Marlborough. 13
In May, 1970, the executors sold 100 canvases selected by Lloyd for
$1,800,000, payable over twelve years without interest to Marlborough A. G.,
a Liechtenstein affiliate. They also consigned the balance of the works, 698
paintings, to Marlborough Gallery, Inc., the New York gallery. The execu-
tors thereby retained title but gave Lloyd complete control over these
consigned works for an irrevocable twelve year period, at a commission rate
of fifty percent for Marlborough, or forty percent if Lloyd sold to another
dealer. 4
As for the 100 sold outright, it was claimed that nothing in effect was to be
paid since, as was manifest to Reis' and Lloyd's shrewd art acumen, this
purchase price meant that payment could be made through sales of a
relatively few of the paintings so acquired.' 5 In fact, after waiting four
months from the time he acquired ownership in May, 1970, within a period of
three months Lloyd proceeded to resell twelve of the 100 to collectors at six to
ten times the amount he undertook to pay.' 6
As to the consigned paintings, the petitioners claimed that by failing to
provide for itemized minimum resale prices for specific paintings in the
consignment agreement, and thereafter avoiding presentation of inventories
and accounts of resales, Reis and Lloyd with the anticipated continuing
acquiescense of the other executors could furtively siphon off through
Marlborough's international complex the best and most salable of the paint-
ings remaining after sale of the 100. It was charged that within six months
after gaining control of the consigned paintings, Reis and Lloyd embarked
upon the execution of this second phase of their plan by transferring some
thirteen of the most aesthetically important and commercially valuable
paintings in the estate to a Marlborough Liechtenstein affiliate in a "bulk"
transaction at "falsely low prices.."' 7
11 Id.
12 Id. at AGA112 55 & 59.
13 84 Misc. 2d at 834-35, 846-47, 850-52, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 932-33, 948-50. See note 6 supra.
14 Id. at 849-50, 379 NY.S.2d at 947.
Is Id. at 849-51,379 N.Y.S.2d at 945-47.
"Id. at 850,379 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
17 Id. at 872, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 964-65.
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The Findings and Legal Conclusions in Estate of Rothko
The surrogate found that the "stakes were obviously millions of dollars" of
potential profits, and that what part of those profits would flow to the estate
was a matter of crucial interest to Reis both as executor and as director of
Marlborough. Moreover, Reis had conflicting fiduciary duties to the estate
and to Marlborough. 0 The surrogate concluded that "Reis was in a serious
position of conflict of interest and divided loyalty" with respect to the
questioned estate contracts, 9 that there could be no doubt as to his dual role
and his planned purpose to benefit Marlborough's interests to the detriment of
the estate, and that his conduct constituted an obvious disloyal breach of
fiduciary trust.2" The surrogate also found that "the finances of the various
Lloyd-controlled companies were intermingled and paintings were invoiced
to and from those companies as convenience served."'" He found Marlbo-
rough was aware of and had knowledge of the fiduciaries' breach of duty.22
As to the terms of the May, 1970 sales and consignment contracts with
Marlborough, the surrogate concluded that "the substantial inadequacy in
contract terms" amounted to "lack of mutuality and fairness." This he further
concluded could be taken into account by way of corroboration or substantia-
tion of the duality of Reis and executor Stamos and its influence upon their
actions, as well as the improvidence and waste verging on gross negligence on
the part of all three executors.2"
The May, 1970 contracts were rescinded, and the executors removed from
office and denied commissions and fees. The return was ordered of 658
Rothko paintings which were subject to the two agreements and not previous-
ly resold by Marlborough.24 The surrogate valued the balance, 140 paintings
reportedly resold by Marlborough, in the amount of $9,252,000. After
reducing by $1,578,266 the sum previously paid to the estate, the surrogate
assessed damages in the amount of $7,339,464 against Marlborough and Reis
and Stamos, 25 and a somewhat lesser amount against the third executor.
In its affirmance of the decisions and findings below, 26 the New York Court
"'Id. at 842, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 938-39.
'9 Id. at 844, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
20 Id. at 846-47, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
11 Id. at 859, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
22 Id. at 860, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
23 Id., at 848, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 944. The appellate division expressly concurred, stating:
Firstly, it might be appropriate to dispel any notion that the 1970 agreements with
Marlborough Gallery, Inc. and Marlborough A.G. were in any way prudent or done in
the best interest of the estate.
[T]he sales of paintings which occurred in 1970 and 1971 [following the May 1970
contracts] are instructive as to their value and illustrate the extent to which the estate was
denuded and defrauded.
This certainly illustrates the improvidence and wastefulness of the 1970 agreements and
emphasizes the bad faith in the execution of those agreements. (Emphasis supplied).
56 App. l)iv. 2d 499, 500-02 (1977).
24 See Record on Appeal at AGA 36.
25 See Record on Appeal at AGA 38.
6 lit re Estate of Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977).
[Vol. 26:573
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of Appeals reaffirmed, clarified, and in some areas extended certain salient
principles pertaining to estate fiduciaries and the law of damages.
The two executors with conflicts of interest had argued that the contracts
could be properly voided only upon a finding of strict self-dealing and
application of the "no further inquiry" rule. 7 Application of the "no further
inquiry" rule would mean that the transactions were voidable on the grounds
of self-dealing, regardless of their fairness and regardless of the good or bad
faith of the executors. The appellants additionally maintained that in order to
conclude that self-dealing in this strict sense existed, it was necessary to find
that the fiduciaries had a proprietary ownership or control interest in the entity
with which they entered into transactions and that they profited from them.
In this case no executor had a proprietary interest, and none were shown to
have directly profited from the transactions. One executor, Reis, was a
director and salaried officer of the gallery, and another, Stamos, hoped to and
did subsequently enter into his own contract with the gallery for the sale of his
art.
The court of appeals' affirmance made it clear that contracts in this context
are voidable at the option of beneficiaries not only when strict self-dealing is
involved and the "no further inquiry" rule is applied, but also when there are
substantial conflicts of interest and the transactions are unfair. The court
concluded that the conflicts were manifest, that issues of fairness were
"intertwined" with those of conflicts, that the courts below "quite properly
indeed" found that the contracts were unfair, that a fiduciary "cannot accept
employment" with the entity with which he deals, that "one must strain the
law rather than follow it" to conclude otherwise, and that the relief granted
was proper.28
The executors had also argued that even if the contracts were voidable,
their conduct did not involve a sufficiently serious breach of trust to warrant
removal from office and denial of statutory commissions. The court of
appeals affirmed the removal of all three executors, including the executor
Levine, who did not have a conflict of interest and who claimed to have been
misled by the advice of the executors' attorney. The court held that a
fiduciary who knows of a breach of trust is liable although he relies on advice
of counsel, and that "he cannot close his eyes, remain passive or move with
unconcern."
29
With respect to the applicable measure of damages, questions arose
concerning the date at which the paintings should be valued and the method
of computation. The appellants argued that after rescission and return of
paintings, the value of unreturned paintings for which a monetary value had
to be substituted should be determined as of the time of the May, 1970
contracts, and not as of the time of trial in 1974, the basis employed by the
surrogate. There had been a substantial increase in the value of the paintings
during this four-year period. The appellants maintained that "present" 1974
values could be utilized only if the fiduciaries had a "duty to retain" property
17 401 N.Y.S.2d at 453 (43 N.Y.2d 305).
2s Id. at 454-58.
29 Id. at 455.
1977]
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but nevertheless sold it. Conversely, they argued that when the situation
merely involved issues of authorized sales for too low a price, the measure of
damages was limited to the difference between the value of the property at
the time of disposition and the price actually received.
30
In rejecting this argument, the court of appeals concluded that in situations
in which the fiduciary "has not simply acted imprudently" but "has violated an
integral condition of the trust" and has effected "inherently wrongful
transfers," the consequences are the same as when there is a "duty to retain"
property. The result was that the beneficiaries were entitled to be "placed in
the same position they would have been in" if there were no breach, and were
entitled to elect to take the greater "present" value.
31
In addition, the surrogate, in assessing the "present" value of the unre-
turned paintings utilized an "average" value for the paintings rather than
evaluating each painting individually. In affirming, the court of appeals
concluded that such a method is proper when a reasonable basis for computa-
tion exists, and that the surrogate acted reasonably in finding averaged
values. 32 The court also affirmed the surrogate's method of computation over
objections that the gallery should receive credits for its promotional expenses
(the gallery had claimed these increased the value of the paintings) and for
commissions which the estate would normally have paid upon sales of
paintings and to which the gallery would normally be entitled. Implicitly, the
court determined that the risk of loss involved in such matters was to be borne
by the wrongdoer.
The Legal Documents and Advice Which Failed to
Ensure Rothko's Intentions for His Art
Three basic legal events, reflected in documents executed by Rothko in the
period preceding his death, set the stage for disregard of his intentions
concerning the placement of his art. These were: (1) the execution of a will in
September, 1968 in which Rothko left the entire residue of his estate, the bulk
of which consisted of his works, to a non-profit foundation to be organized;
(2) an unprecedented, for Rothko, bulk sale of his paintings to Marlborough in
February, 1969 which incorporated an agreement to sell exclusively to and
through Marlborough for eight years; and (3) the organization of the major
beneficiary, the Mark Rothko Foundation, Inc. in July 1969.
The only known professional advice Rothko received with regard to all of
these matters came from Bernard Reis, his "intimate friend and confident"
who "acted for years as his business and professional advisor."3 3 As explicitly
noted by the surrogate and one of the appellate division justices: "Executor
Reis drafted and supervised the execution of the will. He was a certified
30 Id.
31 Id. at 455-56.
32 Id. at 456-57.
3 See Record on Appeal at A2231, A2316-18, A2474, A4612-17, A4737-39, A4743-50,
A4761-66. See also Marlborough's Brief in Appellate Division at 11.
(Vol. 26: 573
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public accountant, and although not licensed to practice law, had grad-
uated from law school. 34
Rothko's Will
In his two-page will, dated September 13, 1968, which had been prepared
and supervised solely by Reis, Rothko bequeathed the entire residue of his
estate to the Mark Rothko Foundation, Inc.; but the Foundation's charter,
prepared with Reis' advice and through Reis' attorney, stated no specific
purposes for it. 35
Rothko's widow died six months after his death. "Rothko had bequeathed
$250,000 to her, as well as the family residence and its contents which included
a number of paintings. Kate Rothko and her younger brother, both of whom
were minors at the time of his death, elected pursuant to New York estate law
to take the excess over one-half of the gross estate, less debts, bequeathed to
charity. The Foundation, however, has remained the principal beneficiary.
36
Although Rothko bequeathed the residue of his estate which included
some 800 paintings to the Foundation, not a word was said with respect to the
Foundation's purposes, as to how the Foundation should protect and place his
art, or whether it should in fact receive any or all of his paintings as a
distribution "in kind," nor did the document speak to whether or how the
executors should sell or otherwise dispose of some or all of Rothko's works.
Rothko's 1969 Bulk Sale to Marlborough
Lloyd acquired his New York gallery in 1963, immediately retained Reis'
accounting firm, and made Reis a co-signatory for Marlborough's New York
bank accounts. Reis, who was deeply enmeshed in the art world, introduced
leading artists to Lloyd, among them Rothko. 37 In 1963 Rothko sold fifteen
paintings to Marlborough Liechtenstein and entered into an exclusive agency
contract with respect to any marketing of his work outside of the United
States. It was Reis who negotiated an interest-fee payout term in this
transaction and the terms other than price.38 After this sale to Marlborough in
1963, Rothko sold no paintings directly to Marlborough until 1969. 3 9
The last two years of Rothko's life were marred by misfortune and
depression. In early 1968 Rothko suffered a serious heart attack and was
hospitalized. In the summer of 1968, after a stay in Cape Cod, Rothko
decided to live alone. He left his home at East 95th Street and thereafter slept
at his studio. Rothko's state of mind during this period is disclosed in a
34 Will of Rothko, 56 App. Div. 2d 499, 505, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, (1977); Estate of Rothko, 84
Misc. 2d 830,837,379 N.Y.S.2d 923, (Sur. Ct. 1975).
35 84 Misc. 2d at 837-39, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 934. See Record on Appeal, exh. 11 at SRA85, exh.
133 at SRA105. See also Record on Appeal at A4743-47, A4761-66.
31 In re Estate of Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d at 305,401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977).
'7 Reis' and Stamos' Brief in Court of Appeals at 17-18. See Record on Appeal at A2473-74.
38 See Record on Appeal, exh. 10 at A4877, exh. 559 at A5127, exhs. 561 & 562. See also Record
on Appeal at A2231-34, A2246.
39 Record on Appeal at A4008, A4041.
1977]
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1977
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
discription, written in a catalogue by Donald McKinney, then Marlborough's
New York president, of the manner in which Rothko lived:
When he returned to the city that Autumn he decided to move into
his studio to live alone. His needs there were very simple. The tiled
walls of the carriage house (which is what the studio had been) were
masked-off by great temporary walls on which paintings could be
hung and moved via an arrangement of pulleys. The big painting
room was lighted from a high, pyramid shaped skylight in the center
of a ceiling some thirty feet high. A bed, some chairs, a table and his
record player completed the living arrangements. There was a total
lack of any personal objects and it was in this immense space that he
would sit, sometimes for hours, looking at his paintings, thinking and
meditating about them. He continued to live and work in his studio
until his death.40
There is no evidence of any prior sale by Rothko comparable to the sale on
February 21, 1969, when he entered into the agreement with Marlborough
Liechtenstein wherein he sold eighty-seven paintings, including twenty-six
works on canvas and sixty-one on paper, for $1,050,000 payable over ten years
without interest (later extended to 14 years). Reis also acted as Rothko's
adviser in this transaction, and it was clearly Reis who advised Rothko as to
the interest-free payout term and the "supplementary agreement" which
involved an eight-year "restraint" provision.4 Until just a year before his
death, therefore, Rothko had disposed of his paintings sparingly.
In December, 1969 Rothko sold an additional eighteen canvases to
Marlborough. The interest-free payout terms of this agreement were appar-
ently approved by Reis. On the day of Rothko's suicide, Donald McKinney
was on his way to Rothko's studio to arrange for the purchase of additional
paintings and to plan arrangements for the Venice Biennale to which Rothko
had been invited to show his art. 42
Whatever compulsions or considerations induced Rothko to enter into the
1969 sales contract, they were uncharacteristic of a life-time's reluctance to
sell paintings and of Rothko's intense concern for the placement of his art.
Environmental conditions for Rothko's art such as were realized at the Tate
Gallery in London and in the Houston chapel 43 constitute actions taken by
Rothko which confirm his artistic intentions.
44
The Mark Rothko Foundation
Rothko had caused the Foundation to be organized in July, 1969. 45 At the
10 Record on Appeal, exh. 62 at XVI.
1' Record on Appeal, exh. 67, at A4897 & A4918. See also Record on Appeal at A2231, A2246,
A4612-17, A4737-39, A4748-50, A4761-63, A4774.
42 Record on Appeal, exh. 67 at 4897.
41 Record on Appeal at A2903-04. Rothko was the only American honored with a separate
room for his paintings on a permanent basis in the Tate Gallery in London. The Rothko Chapel in
Houston was especially constructed to house a group of paintings Rothko created for it, and it has
become a shrine and "magnet" for visitors. See Art News, Dec., 1976, at 35.
44 See Record on Appeal at A2903-04. See also Trial Transcript at 116, 118-23.
45 See Record on Appeal, exh. 133 at SRA105, exh. 11 at SRA85.
[Vol. 26: 573
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time of the May, 1970 contracts after Rothko's death there were six directors
of the Foundation, including Reis and his two co-executors, Stamos and
Levine. Neither before nor after the May, 1970 contracts, however, did any
of the executors speak to the non executor directors about the contracts. The
contracts remained concealed.
46
The certificate of incorporation of the Mark Rothko Foundation, Inc., was
exceptional in its omission of any of Rothko's specific intentions. It provided
only for general "charitable" purposes.47 As in the case of Rothko's will, here
again there was a complete failure to state or suggest Rothko's long abiding
hopes and plans for his extraordinary collection. After Rothko's death and
after the May, 1970 contracts, the certificate of incorporation was amended to
provide a single specific purpose - the making of grants to mature artists.41
Since all of Rothko's paintings had already been disposed of, no purpose
involving the protection, placement, or propagation of his art could be carried
out.
Rothko's Intended Purposes for the Foundation"'
Robert Goldwater, a widely recognized and highly regarded art historian
known to be the person Rothko had chosen to write a book about his work and
one of the original non executor directors of the Foundation, disclosed his
understanding as to Rothko's purposes up to and after the time of Rothko's
death. His statement describes the Foundation's purposes as two-fold: the
taking and propagating of Rothko's art, and the helping of elderly artists. 50
46 Id. at A396.
With the executors on the Board of Directors, the Foundation did not enter the proceedings
until, upon the initiative of the Attorney General, petitioners moved on June 14, 1972 for a
temporary restraining order restricting further sales of paintings, 71 Misc. 2d 230, modified and
aff'd 40 App. Div. 2d 965 (1972). The Foundation then intervened in opposition to the Attorney
General and denied allegations of wrongdoing leveled against the Executors and Marlborough,
and supported the executors Reis and Stamos and Marlborough, "urging that the Marlborough
respondents retain control of the estate paintings." The Surrogate observed that:
The Foundation, . . . does not seek to receive paintings from the estate in kind, or
restitution or damages. Nor does it contend, as do petitioners, that estate paintings, at
least some of them, should be sold, lent or given to museums to preserve for public
access the cultural heritage of the testator's masterpieces.
84 Misc. 2d 830,836-37 (1975). See also Estate of Rothko, N.Y.L.J. December 22,1972, p. 15 col. 4
(Record on Appeal at FA19) where, in denying a motion by the Foundation to dismiss the
Attorney General's cross-petition, the Surrogate stated: "The Foundation is supporting the
position of the executors and the galleries and, by its present motion, is seeking to eliminate the
Attorney General as a party and to this extent to lessen the forces opposing the executors."
(emphasis supplied) Record on Appeal at FA21, 22. He also noted that "it is plain that the
executors and the Foundation were interlocked . (FA 25,26).
" See Record on Appeal, exh. 133 at SRA105.
41 See Record on Appeal, exh. 58.
41 Rothko's purposes were presented in a separate proceeding in the New York Supreme
Court (trial court). In re Mark Rothko Foundation, No.21752/1976, New York Law Journal, Jan.
11, 1977, at 10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (unpublished opinion of Asch, J.). This proceeding
commenced by Reis and Stamos, was an attempt to invalidate the election in May, 1976 of a new
board of directors of the Foundation, which resulted in the termination of Reis' and Stamos'
directorship. The election was held by the then non-executor directors of the Foundation, with
the concurrence and agreement of the Attorney General's office. See Affidavit on Behalf of the
Attorney General, dated Aug. 1, 1977, filed in Court of Appeals. [hereinafter cited as Affidavit on
Behalf of Attorney General].
" Affidavit on Behalf of Attorney General, supra note 49 at .43-44 & exh. 11. Robert
1977]
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Following Rothko's death, Goldwater heard that the purposes had been
changed to help elderly and needy artists only, and wrote a letter to Reis
asking that this be discussed. As a result, a meeting was held at which
Goldwater stated that he was told by one or more of the executors that Rothko
had indicated a change of purpose before his death.5 1 Papers received by the
Attorney General's office from Goldwater's executor showed the following to
be Goldwater's specific understanding of Rothko's purposes:
1) To hold the bulk of Mark Rothko's pictures, and to exhibit
and disperse many of them to museums and private collections in
such ways, including sales and gifts to public institutions, as to
protect Mark Rothko's achievement and reputation, being especially
conscious of his wish to have his paintings seen in groups rather than
singly.
2) From the proceeds of the sales of a portion of Mark Rothko's
pictures to make grants to mature artists who, regardless of any
judgment of their talent had displayed lifelong dedication to their art
and were in need of financial assistance.5 2
In a letter to Reis dated October 19, 1970, prior to disclosure of the
executors' contracts with Marlborough, William Rubin, the Curator of
Painting and Sculpture of the Museum of Modern Art in New York City,
wrote:
At the time Mark first spoke to me about the Foundation, he was
most anxious that it serve:
1) to keep his oeuvre out of what he always deprecatingly
referred to as 'the marketplace' (an attitude frequently expressed in
his public and private statements);
2) that it keep certain groups of important works (not only
mural series) together; and
3) that these works be placed in hospitable contexts. At that
time, the grants to older artists were clearly of secondary concern to
him and, indeed, he mentioned them as a legal necessity (citing you
[Reis] in this instance) if the Foundation as a whole was to be
acceptable to the government. 53
In addition, Kate Rothko Prizel, the daughter of Mark Rothko and
petitioner in the Rothko proceedings, submitted her affidavit in the supreme
court proceeding, stating in pertinent part:
My father was always deeply concerned with the fate of his
paintings, how and to whom they would be disposed of, the
conditions in which they were seen or exhibited and the environ-
Goldwater died during the course of the Rothko proceedings. His statement was given to the
Attorney General's representative which then appeared in papers which were subpoenaed from
Goldwater's estate.
5, Affidavit on Behalf of Attorney General, supra note 49 at 43-44 & exh. 11.
52 Id. at 45 & exh. 13.
-3 Id. at 45-46 & exh. 11.
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ments in which they were placed. This deep concern, over the span
of his artistic life, caused him to be reluctant to sell his paintings, very
cautious as to whom they were sold, and extremely concerned about
the way they were exhibited.54
Consequences of the Advice Given Rothko
Whatever Rothko's reasons for entering into the February, 1969 agree-
ment, the sale appeared to have little relation to the fair market value of
Rothko's paintings and, significantly, to unnecessarily contradict Rothko's
long standing desire to retain-as many of his paintings as possible for their
ultimate proper placement.
This becomes clear when the sale is considered in relation to an offer made
to Rothko in the Fall of 1968 by Arnold Glimcher, President of Pace Gallery, a
leading New York City modern art firm, and Ernest Beyeler, an international
dealer from Basel, Switzerland. 55 The testimony of both Glimcher and
Beyeler was that in the Fall of 1968 they visited Rothko at his studio and made
an offer to purchase a mixture of medium to large paintings at approximately
$30,000 each. Rothko was receptive, but wanted an investment of $500,000 in
cash. This was agreed to. Rothko then said, however, he would have to
discuss the matter with Bernard Reis. The following day Beyeler and
Glimcher returned to the studio. Rothko, emotional and with tears in his
eyes, informed them that he was unable to make the deal. Within a day or
two Beyeler returned to the studio, at which time Rothko broke down in tears
but could not explain why he was unable to deal with them.
6
A sharp disparity exists between the amounts involved in this 1968 offer
and those Rothko received a few months later pursuant to the February, 1969
agreement. Beyeler and Pace were prepared to pay $500,000 in cash for some
seventeen paintings. Marlborough committed itself to pay $1,050,000 with-
out interest over a period of fifteen years for eighty-seven paintings, twenty-
six canvases and sixty-one papers, which Marlborough later claimed were
Rothko's best. The discounted value to Rothko because of the interest-free
payout factor at the time of sale in February, 1969 was $614,000 for eighty-
seven paintings,57 in contrast to Beyeler-Pace offer to pay $500,000 for
approximately seventeen.
Reis had presumably advised Rothko to accept a long payout term in 1969
in order to reduce annual income for tax purposes.5 8 But the Beyeler-Pace offer
demonstrated that Rothko could have achieved the same result while selling
far fewer paintings. If Rothko sold only several paintings a year at a price of
at least $30,000 per painting, he could have limited his income to the level of
54 Id. at 47-48 & exh. 9.
51 Beyeler is generally recognized as one of the great dealers in Twentieth Century art. See
The Man the Art World Loves to Hate, N.Y. Times, June 15,1975 (Magazine), at 12-15.
56 See Record on Appeal at A2905-07, A2970-71, A3068-79, A3116-17, A3141-44.
57 Because the prime rate of interest in February, 1969 was approximately 7l2 percent, these
payments are discounted at 8 percent since this would constitute the most conservative estimate
of the interest rate which Marlborough would have to pay.
58 See notes 33 & 41 supra.
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payouts in the 1969 agreement. But, while receiving a similar income, he
would have sold a fraction of the number of paintings disposed of in 1969.
By selling fewer paintings Rothko could have reserved the possibility of
selling in a later rising market. This method would also have conformed with
his desire to relinquish as few paintings as practically possible, and it might
have resulted in ultimately bequeathing more paintings to the Foundation.
Therefore, whatever motivated Reis' advice, it is clear that it did not
advantageously serve Rothko financially, and it ultimately tended to under-
mine his long standing objective of maintaining his oeuvre intact to the
greatest extent possible.
Moreover, Reis was unquestionably assisting Rothko in estate planning
during the years just prior to Rothko's death.5 9 Yet, Reis advised Rothko with
respect to the "supplementary" agreement in his February, 1969 contract,
which purported to give effect to an eight-year exclusive contract with
Marlborough. Then, after Rothko's death and during the proceedings, Reis
argued that this provision represented a "restraint" upon sales except through
Marlborough with the possible exception of four paintings per year, that this
agreement survived Rothko's death, and that as a result the executors' hands
were tied and their bargaining position devastatingly affected.60 The peti-
tioners challenged this position, and the Attorney General maintained that the
"restraint" was not enforceable.6 '
As noted, Rothko's two-page will contained a brief clause which disposed
of a testamentary residue consisting of the vast bulk of his works.6 2 The
51 See notes 33 & 41 supra.
60 Record on Appeal, exh. 67 at 4898, 4901. The 1969 sales contract read: "Mark Rothko
agrees not to sell any works of art for a period of eight years, except to Marlborough A.G. if a
supplementary contract is made." Exhibit 67 at 4898. Upon Reis' advice the "supplementary"
agreement was signed, which in part included a provision that: "Mark Rothko has the option to
sell to Marlborough A.G. an additional four paintings each year at prices not below Marlborough
A.G.'s then current selling prices, the price to be paid being 90% (ninety percent) of the current
selling prices." Exhibit 67 at 4901.
61 Attorney General's Answering Brief as Respondent at 58-61.
62 Record on Appeal, Exhibit 11 at SRA85. Rothko's residuary clause read:
SIXTH: All the rest, residue and remainder of my property, I give and bequeath to
the Mark Rothko Foundation, a non-profit organization, incorporated under the laws of
the State of New York. The Directors of the Foundation are to be: William Rubin,
Robert Goldwater, Bernard J. Reis, Theodoros Stamos and Morton Levine.
Interestingly, in a will dated June 1967, which preceded the September, 1968 will by less than a
year and a half and which was also clearly executed under Reis' auspices, Rothko bequeathed the
bulk of his paintings specifically (i.e. "in kind") to the Foundation. This would have precluded
sales by the executors. The pertinent provision in this will read:
SIXTH: I give and bequeath all of the remaining paintings created by me to the non-
profit, educational foundation which is to be created under the laws of the State of New
York. The directors of the foundation are to be: Theodoros Stamos, Mary Alice
Rothko,'Bernard J. Reis, Morton Levine, Ben Heller, William Rubin, Herbert Ferber
and Stanley Kunitz.
Moreover, as far back as June 1959, Rothko and his wife executed the following written statement
addressed to Ferber and Reis:
We have just made wills which provide that in case of our death and Kate's, you are to be
the Executors. Our estates will be divided as set forth in our wills. The principal item
in the estates, of course, is the inventory of paintings, and it is our wish that the pictures
should be sold as follows:
a) The museum or individual who will acquire the largest number to be held in a
single place should be given preference;
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Foundation had not yet been organized at the time Rothko executed his
September, 1968 will. Still, nothing appeared in the will which defined even
generally the functions or purposes of the Foundation. Nor was there any
indication of Rothko's intentions with respect to the placement of his art, or
whether and how dispositions should be made by his executors. It was
certainly apparent that a testamentary scheme for careful disposition of
Rothko's art was necessary, and that at least provisions setting forth guidelines
or objectives were required. While Reis, the draftsman of this will, was not
admitted to the practice of law, this complete omission is conspicuous since he
was a certified public accountant who had graduated from law school and
was considered an elder statesman in the business community of the art
world.6 It is difficult to conceive of it as accidental. Perhaps Reis gave
Rothko oral assurances. But whatever Reis' motivations, the resulting will
failed to ensure Rothko's testamentary objectives with respect to his art.
Most incomprehensibly, when the Foundation was organized in July, 1969
this failure to state Rothko's intentions persisted. The charter of the Founda-
tion simply recited that it was formed for "charitable, scientific and/or
educational purposes. 6 4 In this respect it departed radically from the norm
and failed entirely to implement Rothko's testamentary plans and artistic
aspirations. Again, the result was a complete failure to institute controls over
the ultimate disposition of Rothko's works. This not only opened the door to
dispositions predicated solely upon Rothko's disdained "commercial" consid-
erations, but also paved the way to the executors' abuses in disposing of all of
Rothko's art in a single self-dealing transaction.
Estate of Rothko Demonstrates the Need
for Informative Advice
With the outcome of the Rothko litigation, together with the appointment
of Rothko's daughter as the new administratrix of his estate6 5 and the election
of a new board of directors for the Foundation as a result of the Attorney
General's initiatives, 6  is it likely that the Foundation will revert to Rothko's
long standing intentions and aspirations for his cherished art. But this has
resulted only as the culmination of years of strenuous and costly litigation,
litigation which resulted in large measure from omissions in the instruments
Rothko executed in the period preceding his death.
c) To museums or individuals who will acquire at least three paintings;
d) These conditions for distribution should be adhered to for a period of five years.
No statement of intention was discovered in relation to the probated 1968 will.
" Record on Appeal at A1907, A2818-19, A4512, A4514.
64 Id., Exhibit 133 at SRA 105. The pertinent paragraph in the Foundation's certificate of
incorporation read:
SECOND: The purposes for which it is to be formed are:
To receive and maintain a fund or funds of real and/or personal property and apply
the whole or any part or parts of the income and/or principal thereof exclusively for
charitable, scientific and/or educational purposes by such agencies and means as may
from time to time be found appropriate therefor in pursuance of such purposes.
65 Following the removal of the executors from office, Kate Rothko was appointed sole
administratrix t.t.a. by Surrogate Midonick (Decree entered on January 21, 1976).
66 See note 42 supra.
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Rothko was, of course, a layman and an artist. Nevertheless, the implica-
tions in Estate of Rothko for relationships between legal advisors and artists
are clear. To secure and fulfill ultimate artistic objectives, such a relationship
must be an open and informative one in which the advisor clearly defines the
underlying bases for his advice, and the artist inquires into their essentials.
The fostering of dependence comes easily to many professionals, includ-
ing legal advisors. In a dependent relationship fewer questions are asked and
less time expended. With the artist especially, a claimed desire or need to
avoid the transition from aesthetic involvement to legal practicality may be
expressed and dependence invited. It is submitted here that the legal
advisor, rather than accepting or encouraging a high degree of dependence on
the part of his clients, should, if he is to properly fulfill his function, avoid
fostering such ready dependency. This is particularly true in dealings with
the artist. Insistent and meaningful explanation to the client-artist, that he can
avoid serious frustration only through his own grasp of at least the essentials of
his legal-economic situation as it pertains to his art, is necessary.
The advisor's good faith willingness to provide and explain these essentials
openly and in an artistic framework, rather than assuming a paternalistic role
in which it is implicitly assumed the complexities and ritual of legalities are
beyond the artist's comprehension or concern, is essential. It is similarly
essential that the artist discard his "artistic" cloak sufficiently to involve
himself in the basic legalities affecting him. A genuine sense of professional
responsibility requires recognition that the fostering of dependent relation-
ships may result not only in contra-productive economic consequences but, as
exemplified above, in the most devastating consequences to the life and work
of the artist.
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